

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OS REGISTRY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

APEX - A Single System

FILE

See 18
See 17

FROM:

Director of Security
4E60 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

OS 0 0951/7-A

DATE

1 9 SEP 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

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OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

SA/DCI/C
7E-12 Hqs

Harry:

Attached herewith is another iteration of the proposed memo to the DCI on APEX. Since our last discussion, we have implemented the change in SCI transferability mentioned in the memorandum. I believe, therefore, that the upbeat nature of the memorandum is justified. I remain, of course, open to discussion of any specific points with which you may disagree.

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(17Sep80)

OS 0 0951/7-A

D R A F T

21 AUG 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

STAT
FROM:

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Compartmentation

SUBJECT: APEX - A Single System

1. The Second Apex Quarterly Report mentioned that we are examining difficulties perceived in the course of implementing that part of the APEX concept calling for government agencies to deal in a UNIFORM way with industrial contractors who handle SCI. This memorandum is a report of our progress in conducting this examination.

2. Community acceptance of agreed upon physical security standards for the protection of APEX material was finally obtained last month. These standards will be applicable to both government and industry and will serve as physical security criteria for both the government and industry APEX security manuals.

3. The SECOM Staff is coordinating a Community wide analysis of investigative requirements. The key questions being asked are how many years of a person's life do we need to cover and what investigative sources, e.g., neighborhood interviews, police checks, etc., are really necessary in today's environment in order to make a reliable determination about loyalty and trustworthiness. In addition to seeking uniformity, these questions contain obvious heavy resource implications.

4. Uniform appeal procedures when an individual is denied SCI access are in the process of Community coordination.

5. The Security Committee Staff is reviewing the various industrial security forms that have evolved over the years. They are well along in a very necessary process of culling out duplicate and unnecessary requests for information (one contractor claims that he deals with eleven different personnel security forms).

OS 0 0951/7-A


6. The desire expressed by some contractors to have just one cognizant government agency conduct security surveys, no matter how many agencies share their APEX Control Facilities, has not gone beyond the debating stage. While no one is against uniformity per se, or is in favor of security survey redundancies, there is very real concern expressed by Program Managers and Contract Officers that they will stand to lose the necessary degree of control over their own activities.

7. Another very appealing area of uniformity is ready transferability of access approved individuals from one Agency or Program SCI contract to another. We will have to solve the investigative questions mentioned above and, even more important, look at the adjudicative process in each Agency before persuading everyone to accept each others access approvals without everybody taking a peek at what the approvals are based on. This applies also, of course, to accepting each others denial of access.

8. In summary, we are optimistic that a practical degree of uniformity will be achieved in order to make the APEX security system work. In doing so, we must allay the serious concerns that the quest for uniformity means eventual acceptance of least-common-denominator security standards; loss of a degree of control of activities for which a Program Director has security cognizance and accountability; and limitation on flexibility to make sensible and practical on-the-spot decisions when deviations from the norm are required.

9. The least-common-denominator issue is of particular concern to this Agency, which has investigative criteria, including the polygraph, that have been lauded by the Congress. On the other hand, other Agencies and Programs are wary of the as yet unquantified but suspected tremendous resource implications inherent in any upgrading of the Community's investigative capabilities.

10 These issues are being addressed in the context of an orderly development and implementation of APEX. We are confident that these difficulties will be overcome without detriment to the security of any SCI programs.



STAT

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FILE

APEX - A Single System

STAT

[redacted]
Director of Security
4E-69 Headquarters

21 AUG 1980

STAT

STAT

[redacted]
SA/DCI/Compartmentation
7E-12 Headquarters

Harry:

Per our recent conversation on the topic of uniformity in industry regarding APEX implementation, I believe a text such as that suggested in the attached, would more closely reflect this Office's view of the situation.

STAT

/s/

[redacted]

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[redacted] rjw (21 Aug 80)
(Draft memo by DD/Sec/20 Aug 80)

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